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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the security and memorability of free-
form multitouch gestures for mobile authentication. Towards
this end, we collected a dataset with a generate-test-retest
paradigm where participants (N=63) generated free-form ges-
tures, repeated them, and were later retested for memory.
Half of the participants decided to generate one-finger ges-
tures, and the other half generated multi-finger gestures. Al-
though there has been recent work on template-based ges-
tures, there are yet no metrics to analyze security of either
template or free-form gestures. For example, entropy-based
metrics used for text-based passwords are not suitable for
capturing the security and memorability of free-form ges-
tures. Hence, we modify a recently proposed metric for an-
alyzing information capacity of continuous full-body move-
ments for this purpose. Our metric computed estimated mu-
tual information in repeated sets of gestures. Surprisingly,
one-finger gestures had higher average mutual information.
Gestures with many hard angles and turns had the highest
mutual information. The best-remembered gestures included
signatures and simple angular shapes. We also implemented
a multitouch recognizer to evaluate the practicality of free-
form gestures in a real authentication system and how they
perform against shoulder surfing attacks. We conclude the
paper with strategies for generating secure and memorable
free-form gestures, which present a robust method for mo-
bile authentication.
1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and tablets today are important for secure
daily transactions. They are part of multi-factor authentica-
tion for enterprises [20], allow us to access our email, make
1-click payments on Amazon, allow mobile payments [31]
and even access to our houses [13]. Therefore, it is important
to ensure the security of mobile devices.
Recently, mobile devices with touchscreens have made
gesture-based authentication common. For example, the An-
droid platform includes a 3x3 grid that is used as a standard
authentication method, which allows users to unlock their
devices by connecting dots in the grid. Compared with text-
based passwords, gestures could be performed faster while
Figure 1: This paper studies continuous free-form mul-
titouch gestures as means of authentication on touch-
screen devices. Authentication on touchscreens is nor-
mally done with a grid-based method. Free-form gesture
passwords have a larger password space and are possibly
less vulnerable to shoulder surfing. We note that there
are no visual cues for the gestures, the gesture traces are
shown only after creating the gesture.
require less accuracy. Although grid-based gestures better
utilize the capabilities of touchscreens as input devices, they
are limited as an authentication method. For example, a vi-
sual pattern drawn on a grid is prone to attacks such as shoul-
der surfing [37] and smudge attacks [1].
This paper studies free-form multitouch gestures without
visual reference; that is, gestures that allow all fingers draw
a trajectory on a blank screen with no grid or other template.
An example of the creation process is depicted in Figure 1,
where the gesture traces are shown only after the gesture
was created. This method bears potential, because it relaxes
some of the assumptions that make the grid-based methods
vulnerable. In particular, arbitrary shapes can be created.
Moreover, as more fingers can be used, in principle more in-
formation can be expressed. Technically such gestures can
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be scale and position invariant, allowing the user to gesture
on the surface without visually attending the display. Con-
sider, for example, drawing a circle as your password. This
may be beneficial for mobile users who need to attend their
environment. Nevertheless, although no visual reference is
provided, mnemonic cues referring to shapes and patterns
can still be utilized for generating the gestures. Finally, when
multiple fingers are allowed to move on the surface and no
visual reference is provided, observational attacks may be
more difficult.
Previous work on gestures as an authentication method
has focused on two major directions: one was whether the
same gesture can be correctly recognized in general [12, 28]
or in a specific environment such as handwriting motion de-
tected by Kinect-cameras [32], predefined whole-body ges-
tures detected from wireless signals [25], and mobile device
movement detected by built-in sensors [27]. Studies of the
security of gestures look at either the protection of gestures
from specific scenarios [37, 29, 32, 8], or an indirect mea-
surement of security [14, 22]. Further, these works have fo-
cused on understanding performance of template gestures re-
peated by participants, not user-generated free-form gestures
as the present work.
Our goal is to understand the security of this method by
measuring information capacity and studying memorability
in a dataset that allowed users to freely choose the kind of
multitouch passwords they deemed best. We conducted a
controlled experiment with 63 participants in a generate-test-
retest design. At first, participants created and repeated ges-
tures (generate), then trying to recall it after a short break
(test) and recalling it again after a period of time at least
10 days (retest). With this paradigm we were able to ex-
amine the effect of time on how participants memorize their
gestures. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
present a study how people actually recall their gestures af-
ter a delay.
To analyze the security of the gestures, we use a novel
information metric of mutual information in repeated mul-
tifinger trajectories. We base our metric on a recent metric
that was used for a very different purpose, specifically the es-
timation of throughput (bits/s) in continuous full-body mo-
tion [24], and it has not been used previously for authentica-
tion. Because multitouch gestures are continuous by nature
the standard information metrics cannot be directly applied.
What is unique to gesturing over discrete aimed movements
(physical and virtual buttons) is that every repetition of a
trajectory is inherently somewhat different [17]. However,
when this variability grows too large, the password is use-
less, because it is both not repeatable by the user and not
discriminable from other passwords. The information met-
ric should capture this variability. In our metric, a secure
gesture should contain a certain amount of “surprise", i.e.
some turns or changes, while still being able to be repro-
duced by the user itself. We also include mutual information
calculation to separate the complexity of controlled and in-
tended features of the gesture and that of uncontrolled and
unreproducible features.
Our results show that several participants were able to cre-
ate secure and memorable gestures without guidance and
prior practice. However, many participants used multiple
fingers in a trivial way, just repeating the same gesture. Our
implementation of a practical multitouch recognizer shows
that the free-form gestures can used as a secure authenti-
cation mechanism, and are resistant to shoulder-surfing at-
tacks.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. Report on patterns in user-generated free-form multi-
touch gestures generated from 63 participants with a
typical tablet;
2. Adaptation of a recent information theoretic metric for
measuring the security and memorability of gestures;
3. A design and implementation of a practical multitouch
gesture recognizer to evaluate free-form gestures ap-
plicability for authentication;
4. A preliminary study on a shoulder-surfing attack that
indicates the potential of free-form gestures against such
attacks.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss related work on biometric-rich
authentication schemes, graphical passwords, and password
memorability.
2D gesture authentication schemes. Similar to free-form
gestures, biometric-rich authentication schemes are based on
the premise that when a user performs a gesture on a touch-
screen they will do this in such a way that features can be ex-
tracted that will uniquely identify them later on [12, 28, 39,
3]. Similar ideas have been applied to recognizing motions
with Kinect [32]. Specifically, Sae-Bae et al. [28] has shown
that there is a uniqueness to the way users perform identi-
cal set of template 2D gestures based on biometric features
(e.g. hand size and finger length). Frank et al. [12] demon-
strated that the way a user interacts with a smartphone forms
a unique identifier for that user; they show that the way a
user performs simple tasks (e.g. scrolling to read or swip-
ing to the next page) is performed in a unique way such that
the coordinates of a stroke, time, finger pressure, and the
screen area covered by a finger are measurements that could
be used to classify said user. Zheng et al. [39], operating
on similar principles, have studied behavioral authentication
using the way a user touches the phone – the features ex-
tracted included acceleration, pressure, size, and time. Bo et
al. [39] performed recognition by mining coordinates, dura-
tion, pressure, vibration, and rotation. Cai et al. [5] exam-
ined six different features (e.g. sliding) and compared data
such as the speed, sliding offset, and variance between fin-
ger pressures. Deluca et al. [8] developed a system for au-
thentication by drawing a template 2D gesture on the back
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of a device using two phones connected back to back. The
security of the gesture is analyzed through various methods
by an attacker to replicate the original biometric or graphical
password – there is no analysis performed as to the security
content of the gesture, just its difficulty to be reproduced.
3D gesture authentication schemes. 3D gesture recog-
nition can be performed, most recently, using camera-based
systems (e.g. Kinect) [32] or using wireless signals [25].
With the camera-based systems, a user would trace a ges-
ture out in space and the image gets compressed into a two
dimensional image and processed for recognition [32]. Pu et
al. [25] have shown that three-dimensional gestures can be
recognized by measuring the Doppler shifts between trans-
mitted and received Wi-Fi signals.
Graphical and text-based passwords security and mem-
orability. There has been considerable work on cued graph-
ical passwords, a survey is offered by Biddle et al. [2] for
the past twelve years. In particular, there has been anal-
ysis on how Draw a Secret (DAS) [16] type of graphical
passwords measures up to text-based passwords in terms of
dictionary attacks [23]. Oorschot et al. [23] go on to de-
scribe a set of complexity properties based for DAS pass-
words and conclude that symmetry and stroke-count are key
in how complicated a DAS-password can be. They do not
provide a direct measurement of this for DAS-password; the
analysis is restricted to constructing a model to perform a
dictionary attack and show that there are weak password
subspaces based on DAS symmetry. For text-based pass-
words Florencio et al. [11] studied people’s web password
habits, and found that people’s passwords were generally
of poor quality, they are re-used and forgotten a lot. Yan
et al. [36] were among the first to study empirically how
different password policies affect security and memorability
of the text-based passwords. Chiasson et al. [6] conducted
laboratory studies on how people recall multiple text-based
passwords compared to multiple click-based graphical pass-
words (PassPoints [34]). They found that the recall rates
after two weeks were not statistically significant from each
other. Everitt et al. [9] analyzed the memorability of multiple
graphical passwords (PassFaces [2]) through a longitudinal
study and found that users who authenticate with multiple
different graphical passwords per week were more likely to
fail authentication than users who dealt with just one pass-
word.
Security Analysis of Graphical Passwords and Ges-
tures. Most security analysis focus on preventing shoulder
surfing attacks from hijacking a graphical password or ges-
ture [37, 29, 8]. The methods depend on implementing tech-
niques to make the input more difficult to attack (e.g. making
the graphical password disappear as it is being drawn [37]).
Another team designed an algorithm based on Rubine [26]
that told users whether or not their gestures are too similar,
although the metric for this is inherently based on the rec-
ognizer’s scoring capabilities and not on a measure of the
gesture by itself [19]. Schaub et al. [29] suggest that the
size of the password space for a gesture is based on three
spaces: design features (how the user interacts with the de-
vice), smartphone capabilities (screen size, etc.), and pass-
word characteristics (existing metrics of security, usability,
etc). Security in this context refers to a measured resistance
to shoulder surfing.
Continuing with security analysis, brute force attacks on
gestures have been examined in some studies [32, 38, 2].
Zhao et al. [38] have examined the security of 2D gestures
against brute force attacks (assisted or otherwise) when us-
ing an authentication system where a user will draw a gesture
on a picture. A measure of the password space is developed
and an algorithm under which a gesture in that space can
be attacked. The attack is capable of guessing the password
based on areas of the screen that a user would be drawn to-
wards. This study does not concern itself with the security
of the gesture drawn, instead it is focused on where a user
would target in a picture-based authentication schema – it
does not address free-form gesture authentication. Serwadda
et al. [30] showed that authentication schema based on bio-
metric analysis (including one by Frank et al. [12]) can be
cracked using a robot to brute force the inputs using an algo-
rithm that is supplied swipe input statistics from the general
population.
Finally, on non-security related work, Oulasvirta et al.
[24] studied the information capacity of continuous full-body
movements. Our metric is motivated by their work. Specif-
ically, they did not study 2D gestures or their security and
memorability or use for an authentication system. When
asked to create gestures for non-security purposes, previous
work [14, 22] indicates that people tend to repeat gestures
that are seen on a daily basis and are context-dependent (e.g.
that the gestures people perform are dependent on whether
they are directing someone to perform a task or receiving
directions on a task).
3. SECURITY OF GESTURES
In this section, we present our novel information-theoretic
metric for evaluating the security and memorability of ges-
tures. We briefly discuss why existing entropy-based met-
rics used to evaluate discrete text-based passwords [4] are
not suitable for gestures, and move to present our metric for
security and memorability of continuous gestures. We have
modified a recent metric on analyzing information capacity
of full-body movements [24] to estimate the security of a
multitouch gesture.
Multitouch gestures on a touchscreen surface produce tra-
jectory data where the positions of one or more end-effectors
(finger tips) are tracked over time. The continuous and multi-
dimensional nature of multitouch gesture data poses some
challenges for defining the information content compared
to regular keyboard-based passwords that only gauge infor-
mation in discrete movements corresponding to key events
(pressdown) caused by a single end-effector (e.g., finger,
cursor) at a time. Multitouch gestures involve multiple end-
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effectors and continuous movement. To our knowledge, no
information theory based security metric has been proposed
for multitouch gestures as passwords.
The core idea is to demonstrate that there is an association
between the security of a gesture password and the informa-
tion content of the gesture. Intuitively, information content
is a property of a message or a signal (such as a recorded
gesture): it measures the amount of surprisingness, or unpre-
dictability, of the signal with the important additional con-
straint that any surprisingness due to random (uncontrolled)
component in the signal is excluded. Information-theoretically,
the surprisingness of a message, or more precisely, of a source
generating messages according to a certain probability dis-
tribution, can be measured by the entropy H(x) associated
with the random variable, x, whose values are the messages.
For instance, the surprisingness of a key stroke chosen uni-
formly at random among 32 alternatives is log2(32) = 5
bits; five times that of an answer to a single yes–no question.
A similar measure of surprisingness can be also associated to
continuous random variables, called the differential entropy,
but it lacks a similar meaning in terms of yes–no questions
as it can, for instance, take negative values. For more de-
tailed definitions of the used information-theoretic concepts,
please see e.g. Cover and Thomas [7].
For discrete as well as continuous messages, the informa-
tion content can be defined as the mutual information I(x; y)
between two random variables, x and y, and it gives the re-
duction in the entropy (surprisingness) of one random vari-
able (y) when another one (x) becomes known. Note that
a message can have high entropy (complexity) without the
mutual information (information content) being high but not
vice versa.1
The metric we use for the information content in repeated
gestures is defined as the mutual information between two
realizations of the same gesture. The underlying assumption
is that any dependencies between the two gestures must be
intended, and conversely, any aspects of the gestures that are
not present in both realizations must be unintended.
The input to the metric comprises of two multitouch move-
ment sequences produced by asking a user to produce a ges-
ture and repeat it. The two gesture trajectories are denoted
by x and y. The trajectories record the locations of each of
the used fingers over duration of the gesture. The informa-
tion content is then the amount of information, as outlined
above in the information-theoretic sense, that is contained in
both x and y, measured by the mutual information.
Computation. Computation of the mutual information
involves a sequence of steps. First, we need to remove from
the sequences their predictable aspects, as far as possible. To
1In fact, to be precise, the inequality I(x; y) ≤ min{H(x), H(y)}
holds only for discrete signals, such as symbolic passwords, but not
for continuous signals, such as gestures, because continuous signals
can have negative entropy [7]. However, even though there is no
theoretical guarantee of it, the intuition that a trivial gesture such as
a straight line cannot contain high information content holds true
in our experiments; see below.
do so, we fit a second order autoregressive model for both of
the sequences separately. For sequence x, the model is:
xt = β0 + β1xt−1 + β2xt−2 + ε
(x)
t , (1)
where β0, β1 and β2 are parameters that we estimate using
the standard least-squares method. The benefit of a second-
order model is its interpretability: it captures the physical
principle that once the movement vector (direction and ve-
locity) is determined, constant movement contains no infor-
mation.
After parameter fitting, we obtain residuals r(x)t for each
frame t:
r
(x)
t = xt − xˆt = (βˆ0 + βˆ1xˆt−1 + βˆ2xˆt−2) (2)
The residuals r(x)t correspond to deviations from constant
movement and are hence the part of the sequence unexplained
by the autoregressive model. They can be used to gauge the
surprisingness of the trajectory. The same procedure is car-
ried out for sequence y. We could now compute the differ-
ential entropy of a residual sequences, but as stated above, it
alone has little meaning and we are in fact only interested in
the mutual information between the two sequences.
Before we compute the mutual information, dimension re-
duction is performed whereby multitouch gestures are repre-
sented using only as many features per measurement as the
data requires. The motivation for this step is that one cannot
simply add information in the movement features in multi-
touch gestures together. Instead, any dependencies between
the fingers should be removed. Intuitively, a multitouch ges-
ture with all fingers in a fixed constellation contains essen-
tially the same amount of information as the same gesture
performed using a single finger. Dimension reduction is per-
formed using principal component analysis (PCA), which
removes any linear dependencies. Following common prac-
tice, the number of retained dimensions is set by finding the
lowest number of dimensions that yields an acceptably low
reprojection error (e.g., mean square error; see [24]).
Once the movement features have been processed by a di-
mension reduction technique (PCA), we treat them indepen-
dently which amounts to simply adding up the information
content in each feature in the end. Hence, the following dis-
cussion only considers the one-dimensional case where both
x and y are univariate sequences.
Another issue in gesture data is that the two gestures x and
y are often not of equal length due to different speed at which
the gestures are performed. This can be corrected by tempo-
rally aligning the sequences using, for instance, Canonical
Time Warping [40]. The result is a pairwise alignment of
each of the frames in x and y achieved by duplicating some
of the frames in each sequence. These duplicate frames are
skipped when computing mutual information to avoid an in-
flating their effect.
Finally, we form pairs of residual values (xt, yt) corre-
sponding to each of the frames in the aligned residual se-
quences and evaluate the mutual information. Since the mu-
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tual information is defined for a joint distribution of two ran-
dom variables, we model the pairs (xt, yt) of residuals in
each frame 1 ≤ t ≤ n using a bivariate Gaussian model,
under which the mutual information is given by the simple
formula
I(x; y) = −n
2
log2(1− ρ2x,y), (3)
where ρx,y is the Pearson correlation coefficient between x
and y.
By substituting the sample correlation coefficient estimated
from the data in place of ρx,y and subtracting a term due to
the known statistical bias of the estimator (see [24]), we ob-
tain the mutual information estimate
Iˆ(x; y) = −n
2
log2(1− r2)− log2(e)/2, (4)
where log2(e) ≈ 1.443 is the base-2 logarithm of the Euler
constant.
The total information content in the gesture, based on two
repetitions, is estimated as the sum of the mutual information
estimates in each of the movement features after dimension
reduction.
Summary. The metric has some promising properties
to serve as an index of security. First, a distinctive feature
of our framework that sets it apart from the work on sym-
bolic password security is that in dealing with continuous
gestures, it is imperative to be able to separate the complex-
ity due to intended aspects of the gesture from that due to its
unintended, and hence non-reproducible, aspects. This is the
main motivation to use mutual information as a basis for the
metric. Second, as mutual information under the bivariate
Gaussian model is determined by the correlation between the
movement sequences (residuals), it is invariant under linear
transformations such as change of scale, translation, or rota-
tion. Hence, the user need not remember the exact scale, po-
sition, or orientation of the gesture on the screen. The metric
is also independent of the size and the resolution of the used
screen unless, of course, the resolution is so low that impor-
tant details of the gesture are not recorded. Third, the time
warping step ensures that variation in the timing within the
gesture has only slight effect on the metric. Fourth, the met-
ric enables comparison between gestures of unequal lengths
and between single-finger and multi-finger gestures, as well
as across different screen sizes and resolutions, on a unified
scale (bits).
4. METHOD
Our study design builds on a generate-test-retest paradigm
where participants were first asked to create a gesture, recall
it, and recall again during the second session, a minimum of
10 days later. Participants were told that they should gener-
ate secure gesture as they would do in real situation and that
their ability to recall them will be tested later. They were not
given any hints about what a secure gesture might be. For
understanding the generation and recall process, we used a
mixed method approach: after generating gesture, all partic-
ipants filled a questionnaire on workload (NASA-TLX [15])
after each task and a short survey in the end of second ses-
sion.
We note that a somewhat similar generate-test-retest de-
sign has been used before by Chiasson et al. [6] to compare
multiple password inference to recall between text-based and
graphical passwords (PassPoints [34]). However, our work
uses TLX forms, and is focused on free-form multitouch
gestures, there are more repetitions and recalls, does not
have a separate login phase, and the questions are asked at
the end.
Next, we describe our volunteer participants, our appara-
tus, data preprocessing, experiment design and procedure.
Participants. We recruited participants with fliers, email
lists, and in person in cafeterias. We required the participants
to be 18 years old or over and familiar with touchscreen de-
vices. We recruited 63 participants in all, from the ages of 18
to 65 (M = 27.2, SD = 9.9), 24 are male and 39 are female.
Their educational background varies: 22 have high school
diploma, 23 have a Bachelor’s degree, 16 have a graduate
degree and two have other degrees.
All 63 participants completed session 1 of our study, and
57 of them returned and participated in session 2. As com-
pensation, participants received $30 for completing the whole
study.They also participated in a raffle of three $75 gift cards.
We have recruited our participants in two batches: first
in May 2013 (33) and second in June 2013 (30). Further,
in order to analyze effect of varying time on recall, the gap
between the two sessions of the study varies. The mean time
gap for the first participants is 14.53 (SD = 5.81) days and
29.52 (SD = 7.57) days for the second.
Our study was approved by our Institutional Review Board.
Apparatus. The gesture data was recorded on a Google
Nexus 10 tablet with Android 4.2.2 as the operating system,
at an average of 200 frames per second (FPS).
Preprocessing. The raw data files were preprocessed us-
ing MATLAB. In the preprocessing, each gesture file is re-
sampled to 60 FPS, to reduce the effect of the uneven sample
rate.
The resampling was done by cubic spline interpolation,
via MATLAB’s built in function interp1d.m. For the x and y
coordinates for each finger, it takes the recorded timestamps
and resamples to a constant rate. The reduction from 200
to 60 FPS takes into account a large amount of duplicate
data created by the touchscreen, and is necessary to prevent
artifacts in the resampling.
FFT analysis showed that the frequency reduction com-
bined with the cubic spline method results in low pass filter-
ing of the data, removing high frequency jitter introduced by
the touchscreen hardware, but preserving the low frequency
content of the gesture data. To deal with the uneven sample
rate in the non-interpolated data, the Lomb-Scargle method
was used.
At this stage, artifacts in the raw data were detected and
corrected as well. The primary such artifact is when a sub-
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ject fails to place their fingers on the touchscreen in the same
order between consecutive trials. As fingers are numbered
sequentially upon being detected by the touchscreen, this
places them out of order, resulting in artificially low scores
in the later analysis. This was corrected by comparing the
starting coordinates of each finger, and correcting the order
to be consistent.
Experiment Design. The experiment followed a 17 x 2
mixed factor design with a repeated measurement variable of
gesture repetition (17 levels) and a between-subject variable
of time gap between sessions (2 levels). In the 17 gesture
repetitions, 10 were performed during the creation process,
followed by another 2 repetitions after a short distraction,
and 5 were performed in the second session.
Procedure. We conducted a two-session study. The sec-
ond session was held after a minimum 10 days after the first
session. The details of the procedure were as follows.
First session: First, the participants were introduced to
the study, which included reading and signing the consent
form, discussion of their rights as participants and how they
will be compensated. Gesture Creation (Generate). Each
participant was given the same tablet and was asked to cre-
ate what they thought would be a secure gesture by drawing
on it. The participants were asked to generate a gesture that
they think others could not guess, but they could also re-
member later.The participants could retry until they felt sat-
isfied with their gesture. Then the participant repeated the
same gesture for additional nine times on the same tablet.
Participants were presented with a blank screen for draw-
ing their gestures. The application did not limit the number
of fingers participants use to create the gesture. However,
the number of fingers used could not be changed during the
drawing process, that is, the gesture has to be drawn con-
tinuously without lifting any fingers from the screen. Once
it was completed, the gesture is displayed on the tablet’s
screen as a colored curve line, as shown in Figure 1. The
display was checked visually, to verify that the gesture was
recorded properly. Subjective Workload Assessment The
participant was asked to fill out NASA-TLX form regarding
the creation process. Distraction. The participant was asked
to perform a mental rotation task and count down from 20 to
0 in mind. Gesture Recall 1. The participant was asked to
recall the gesture by repeating it twice on the same tablet us-
ing the same application. Demographic questions. The par-
ticipant was asked usual demographics questions that were
aggregated and reported above.
Second session: Gesture Recall 2. The participant was
asked to recall his/her gesture by repeating it for five times
on the same tablet using the same application. Subjective
Workload Assessment. The participant was asked to fill
out NASA-TLX form regarding the recall process. Short
Survey. The participants were asked some questions about
the recall process and other thoughts about the study.
5. RESULTS
For each participant who completed both sessions, a total
of 17 gesture repetitions were recorded. In all, 1038 record-
ings were generated, as 6 participants did not attend session
2, and 3 additional traces were not completed. The groups
of repetitions are summarized in Table 1. Because the es-
timated Mutual Information (Iˆ), is computed in pairs, Iˆ is
reported as the mean for the relevant repetitions.
Session Trial # Group
1 1-10 Generate
1 11-12 Recall1
2 13-17 Recall2
Table 1: Repetition Groups by Session # and Trial #. Iˆ
was computed for all pairs of repetitions each group.
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Figure 2: Mean Iˆ and mean gesture duration vs Rep-
etition. Top: Within Generate, mean gesture duration
trended downwards as gestures increased in speed. Bot-
tom: Over the same repetitions, Iˆ trended upwards be-
fore leveling out. It then dropped quickly between Gen-
erate and the two Recalls.
Figure 2 shows the mean Iˆ of each repetition across all
gestures versus the repetition number. During gesture cre-
ation in Generate, Iˆ trended upwards from repetitions 1-4,
and then leveled off from repetitions 5-10. This shows that
it takes at least three repetitions for a participant’s gesture to
become stable.
A second major feature is that by Recall1, repetition 11
and 12, the Iˆ has dropped suddenly, despite a delay of only
a few minutes. Surprisingly, more than 10 days later, Iˆ did
not drop much further in Recall2. The drop between Gener-
ate and Recall1 was more severe for single finger gestures,
and the drop between Recalls 1 and 2 was more severe for
multifinger gestures. In both cases, Iˆ stabilized, at around
27 bits for single finger and 15 bits for multifinger gestures,
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having dropped from an initial value of around 35 and 20
bits respectively.
Figure 2 also shows the amount of time taken to record
each repetition of each gesture. This duration also changed
with repetition. As the number of repetitions increased, the
mean duration of each repetition trended downwards from
around 3 seconds to around 2. Unlike Iˆ , it remained sta-
ble from there through the two recalls. Interestingly, during
Recall2 the multifinger gestures sped up from 2.5 seconds
to under 2 seconds, whereas the single finger gestures stabi-
lized.
A plot of the mean Iˆ of each gesture versus mean duration
appears in Figure 3. This shows that many gestures with a
short duration also had a low Iˆ . The highest Iˆ gestures had a
duration of between 2 and 5 seconds. Iˆ increased with dura-
tion, but had a poor fit, explaining only 5% of the variation,
as the highest duration gestures were either very high or very
low Iˆ . Long duration could thus indicate either a complex,
careful gesture, or a relative lack of practice.
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Figure 3: Mean Iˆ vs. mean gesture duration. The r2
value indicates a poor linear fit, showing little correla-
tion. However, the highest Iˆ gestures were all longer than
2 seconds, suggesting that some degree of precision is re-
quired.
Figure 4 shows that majority of the user-generated ges-
tures had relatively low Iˆ with a only a small tail of high
Iˆ . For Generate, the distribution had a mean of 27.72 bits,
and a standard deviation of 26.30 bits. However, taking only
the second, stable half of Generate, the mean rose to 33.42
bits, with a standard deviation of 31.13 bits. In both cases,
the standard deviation was about the same size as the mean,
indicating a large variability. The histogram shifted as well,
becoming slightly more uniform. Although many user cho-
sen gestures score poorly, some scored highly as well, sug-
gesting that it is possible create guidelines to emulate the
characteristics of high scoring gestures.
We compared mean Iˆ with participant age and gender.
There was a mild negative relationship between Iˆ and age,
with a r2 of 0.08. Seven of the top eight gestures were cre-
ated by participants under the age of 25, with the remain-
ing one under the age of 30. Mean Iˆ for male participants
(N=23) was 29.82 bits and mean Iˆ for female participants
(N=40) was 25.00 bits.
Finally, we looked for defining visual characteristics of
the highest and lowest scoring gestures. We ranked each
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Figure 4: Histogram of mean Iˆ of Generate, per gesture,
showing low scoring, biased distribution.
gesture by its Iˆ in each of the five categories, and evalu-
ated the top five in each category. There was high correla-
tion between the categories, and as such, the top five ges-
tures for each category overlapped significantly, having only
nine unique gestures. The best gestures fell into two groups,
angular paths with many hard turns, and signatures. This
matched our expectations, as the algorithm looks for both
consistency between trials and for large deviations from a
straight line. The defining visual feature of the lowest scor-
ing gestures was having only a few, gentle curves. Many
were multifinger, with the additional fingers merely copying
the motion of the first. A gallery appears in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Gestures ranked by Iˆ for Generate and Re-
call2. Top: Best three gestures, showing the many tight
turns characteristic of high scoring gestures. Bottom:
Worst three gestures, Low scoring gestures had few, gen-
tle turns.
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5.2 Security of Multitouch Gestures
As seen in Figure 2, the mean Iˆ of multifinger gestures
is lower than that of single finger ones. We compared Iˆ of
these gestures to estimate how much additional information
is added by additional fingers. Figure 6 shows the higher
mean Iˆ of single finger gestures, and the rarity of gestures
using more than two fingers. Recall2 showed a greater dif-
ference in Iˆ than Generate, as a number of participants failed
to use the same number of fingers when they returned in ses-
sion 2. Of the 63 participants, 32 decided to create multifin-
ger gestures, and 31 chose to create single finger gestures,
with only three participants using more than two fingers.
Participants were prompted that they could use as many fin-
gers as they liked, but were not instructed on how many to
use.
We performed regression analysis on the effect of the num-
ber of fingers on Iˆ . The result shows that the effect is signif-
icant for the Iˆ of Generate, b = 17.948, t(57) = 2.763, p =
.0077, while not for the Iˆ of Recall2, b = 11.898, t(57) =
1.841, p = .07. However, the regression model only ex-
plained 11.8% of variance in the Iˆ for the significant effect.
In short, the number of fingers is not the most major factor
effecting Iˆ .
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Figure 6: Iˆ and number of fingers used to perform ges-
ture, and change between sessions 1 and 2. This shows
the both the higher performance of single finger gestures,
as well as the rarity of using more than two fingers.
5.3 Factors Affecting Memorability
Figure 7 shows the best remembered gestures. To eval-
uate memorability, we computed the cross group Iˆ of Gen-
erate and Recall2, with pairs consisting of one from each
group, instead of both from within a group. However, the
large differences in Iˆ from gesture complexity obscured the
differences from repetition accuracy, as the cross group Iˆ
has a linear fit with an r2 of 0.65 with the Iˆ of Generate. We
compensated by dividing the mean cross group Iˆ for each
gesture by its Iˆ from Generate.
Gestures that scored highly on the resulting ratio have
the best consistency between Generate and Recall2, as com-
pared to the consistency within Generate. The top gestures
for memorability are shorter and simpler than the top ges-
tures for security.
Once we had a way of comparing how well gestures are
remembered, we investigated what might cause the large dif-
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Figure 7: Top: Best 3 Gestures by memorability. These
have a shorter length and decreased complexity com-
pared to high Iˆ gestures. Bottom: These 3 gestures had
the greatest difference in path between fingers. Two of
the three are a simple mirroring of the path (Left, Mid-
dle), while only (Right) adds a large amount of Iˆ .
ference in Iˆ between sessions. We compared the memorabil-
ity ratio to the time interval between Generate and Recall2,
as seen in Figure 8. The linear fit however, had a r2 of less
than 0.03, showing minimal dependence on the delay be-
tween sessions.
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Figure 8: Memorability vs interval between sessions.
This plot compares the relative quality of gesture recall
versus time between Generate and Recall2. There was
no significant correlation, with a (r2 < 0.03).
5.4 Individual Differences
Given the surprising deficiency of the multifinger gestures,
we looked at specific examples. Only three participants used
multitouch gestures with significantly different motions be-
tween fingers, and in two of the three cases they were simple
mirrorings of the motion. These three gestures appear in
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Figure 7. All other cases were just translations of the same
trace, as if the gesture were made with a rigid hand. Gestures
with minimal additional information per finger were in part
scored low because all gestures were run through a PCA al-
gorithm to remove redundant information, prior to analysis
of Iˆ .
Participants also commonly performed several categories
of error. Despite instructions, 19 of the 32 multifinger us-
ing participants placed their fingers down in an inconsistent
order between sequential trials. This was fixed in prepro-
cessing to ensure that computation of Iˆ used the same fin-
gers. In addition, some participants rotated the tablet either
during a session or between sessions. This stands out visu-
ally when comparing traces, but the algorithm is negligibly
affected by starting angle, as it is looking at the residual as
the trace turns from its origin. This was verified by com-
paring the result with its session one or two counterpart that
did not have said rotated trace. Some of the lowest scoring
gestures featured a rotation between repetitions, and all ges-
tures with rotation between sessions scored poorly on cross
session Iˆ . However, the gestures with cross session rotation
also scored poorly within a session. Only one gesture with
rotation between sessions scored significantly higher on its
within session Iˆ than on its cross session.
Given that error containing gestures scored poorly, even
when excluding those repetition pairs containing the errors,
we take these errors as an indicator of poor recall. Extra fin-
gers or complex shapes are no guarantees of a high score,
without consistent execution. Attention when creating the
gesture is thus important, practicing accurate repetition rather
than just going through the motions.
5.5 Subjective Task Load Assessment
Analysis
This section contains the analysis of the study’s TLX forms.
For each session of our study we asked participants to fill out
one TLX form, which is used to assess subjective workload
of given task. Figure 9 shows the mean score and corre-
sponding 95% confidence interval for each item in the TLX
form, for both sessions.
Item Mental Physical Temporal
p value <0.001 0.025 <0.001
effect size -.038 -0.21 -0.34
Item Performance Effort Frustration
p value 0.029 0.0013 0.072
effect size -0.20 -0.30 -0.17
Table 2: Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the scores of each
item of the TLX result for the two sessions, showing sig-
nificant differences in all except Frustration.
Figure 9 suggests that the mean scores of session two
are lower than those of session one. To prove the point
we conducted a non-parametric repeated-measure Wilcoxon
signed-rank test on the scores of each item from the two ses-
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Figure 9: Mean score and corresponding 95% confi-
dence interval for each item on the TLX form, for the
two sessions of our study. The mean scores of each item
in session two were lower than those of session one.
sions, given the fact that the data does not follow a normal
distribution. The result is shown in Table 2.
From Table 2 we can see that except for Frustration, all
items show significant differences in scores between ses-
sions. It is safe to say that given the data we have, it is very
likely that participants felt the recall task was easier than the
creation task in terms of workload. This could be because of
increased practice or familiarity, and intuitively agrees with
the increase in gesture speed seen in Figure 2.
6. PRACTICAL AUTHENTICATION
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe our extension to a practical
single touch gesture recognizer for multitouch gestures, and
the results of how the participants’ gestures would perform
in a real authentication system based on our multitouch rec-
ognizer. We also present our trial on shoulder surfing at-
tacks that indicates how free-form gestures are robust against
shoulder surfing.
A recognizer works by taking a user’s gesture, passing it
through a recognition algorithm, and computing whether or
not the gesture is a successful match for a stored template.
The device will store a series of templates of which the ges-
tures are compared to for authentication; the best score is
used and compared to a threshold value. We have the fol-
lowing assumptions for the recognizer: 1) location invari-
ance: No matter where the correct gesture is drawn on the
screen, it should be authenticated correctly. 2) scale invari-
ance: No matter what size the correct gesture is drawn to
on the screen, it should be authenticated correctly. 3) rota-
tion invariance: No matter what angle the correct gesture is
9
drawn at on the screen, it should be authenticated correctly.
Location and scale invariance are important when dealing
with cross-platform authentication; the screen dimension in-
herently limits what size the gesture can be drawn to and
the area over which a gesture can be performed would cause
wild variations in where it would be drawn depending on
the user. Rotation invariance is useful for reducing compu-
tational complexity when dealing with individualized free-
form gestures as we have in our data set. We note that
authentication system designers can opt to restrict or relax
these assumptions.
We elected to implement and extend the Protractor [18]
recognition algorithm, a popular nearest neighbor approach.
Given the gesture templates obtained and the two recall sets,
we would like to measure how well the gestures perform.
Protractor is an improvement upon the $1 Recognizer [35],
having both a lower error rate [18] and an effectively con-
stant computational time per training sample as compared to
$1’s growing cost per training sample. Protractor presents it-
self further as an attractive algorithm for the data under con-
sideration since it has low computational complexity com-
pared to other techniques, for example, Dynamic Time Warp-
ing (DTW) [35] and Hidden Markov Models (HMM) [10,
21]. In general, Protractor’s error rate falls with an increas-
ing number of training samples and at 9-10, the error rate is
less than 0.5% [18].
Protractor is only a single touch recognition algorithm;
other projects considering gestures have used more general
techniques for gesture recognition instead of a nearest neigh-
bor approach. For example, Sae-bae et al. [28] applied DTW
to deal with their multitouch gesture set. For the authenti-
cator to remain practical, it needs low computational com-
plexity, high speed, and low error rate per template to be
implemented on a mobile device – Protractor can meet this
demand; DTW cannot. As we are dealing with multitouch
gestures, it is necessary to modify Protractor. The account-
ing procedure is as follows.
Our Multitouch Extension to Protractor
1. Each finger is split into its own set of points and passed
through the algorithm and compared to templates of
similar fingers and the score is computed for each in-
dividually.
2. They are then averaged together.
3. There are provisions built into place to ensure the au-
thentication failure for the wrong number of fingers.
In the case of n fingers versus m, the number of fingers
is compared. If n is equal to m, then the recognizer
continues to the next step. If n is not equal to m, then
the recognizer immediately stops the computation and
registers the score as 0; a failure.
4. This score is then is compared to the threshold value. If
the score is greater than or equal to the threshold then
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Figure 10: This figure shows the ROC curve for the rec-
ognizer across the two data sets with variable template
numbers – ’n’ corresponds to the number of templates.
The top plot is the first data set and the second plot is
the second data set. The ROC curve is a measure of
the performance of a binary classifier; the closer the top
left corner of the plot moves towards the vertical axis,
the better the performance. The first data set is closer
to that corner than the second, showing that the second
data set performed worse and must have a higher equiva-
lent error rate. As the number of templates increases, the
closer the curve shifts up and the better the recognizer
performs. In general, the recognizer classified the first
data set with a lower EER than the second set despite
those being the same gesture types, indicating a weak-
ness on the parts of participants to accurately replicate
their gestures. The EER values can be read in Table 3.
it is considered a positive authentication; otherwise, it
is negative.
It is important to note that the threshold should be set high
enough such that authentication failure is all but guaranteed
for gestures that are being matched to templates other than
their own.
As a reminder, when the participants began the study, they
were asked to repeat their gestures ten times; each of these
ten trials is used by Protractor as templates for that gesture.
There are two authentication data sets under consideration
here: the first is where participants were asked to replicate
their gesture after a mental task and the second where they
were asked to replicate their gesture after at least 10 days.
6.1 Recognizer Performance
We wanted to know how accurately the recognizer is per-
forming across the different gestures in our data sets. To
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quantify this in terms of a numerical estimate and visualize
it, we elected to obtain a Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve and derive from it an Equivalent Error Rate
(EER). The ROC curve gives the visual representation of
how our classifier is performing and the EER value gives
us the numerical estimate for how it is performing; the lower
the EER is, the more accurately the recognizer is perform-
ing.
To find the EER value we need to find the rate at which the
True Positive Rate (TPR) is equivalent to the False Positive
Rate (FPR). These are defined as:
TPR =
True Positives
True Positives+ False Negatives
(5)
FPR =
False Positives
False Positives+ True Negatives
(6)
These values are dependent on the threshold parameter
that the score computed by the recognizer is compared to.
To generate an ROC curve, one must vary the authentica-
tion threshold parameter and measure a (TPR,FPR) value for
each point and plot them. From there, we can determine the
EER visually.
At low threshold values, the classification system would
be accepting virtually any gesture as a validation against any
template gesture. At high values, all input gestures would
be rejected against any other template (even if it is being
matched to the correct one). As the EER value climbs higher,
the reliability of the gesture or the recognizer can be called
into question since false positives are propagating through
the system. In the case of our system, the templates are not
matched to one another. Instead, we have two true cases
for a given gesture in the first data set and five true cases
for a given gesture in the second dataset. All other gesture
attempts in all other datasets (exclusively across these two
sets; no intersections) are considered false cases.
As for how well the gestures and the recognizer performed
in terms of accuracy across the data sets, that information
can be gleaned from the ROC plots given in Figure 10 and
the EER values shown in Table 3. As a reminder, the further
away an ROC curve moves from being a 90-degree box (an
EER of 0%), the worse it is performing. Figure 10 shows
the ROC curves with a varying number of template sizes.
As the number of templates increases, the ROC curves are
pushed further towards the corner and the EER values are
lowered, telling us that a larger number of training templates
leads to improved accuracy. For the first set, the best result
(with 10 templates) is 3.34% and the best result for the sec-
ond set is 13.16%. Note that the higher EER on the second
data set does not speak to the weakness of the recognizer but
rather those of the participants – some participants who re-
turned to attempt their gestures in the second set forgot the
number of fingers they used, registering immediate authen-
tication failure. As such, the increased error in the second
set as compared from the first set can be attributed to recall
# of Templates Set 1 EER Set 2 EER
2 7.07% 15.97%
4 6.42% 14.45%
6 4.13% 13.94%
8 4.10% 13.09%
10 3.34% 13.16%
Table 3: EER Values, Ranked by Template Number.
Listed above are the EER values corresponding to Fig-
ure 10. As the number of templates increases, the lower
the EER value drops and thus the lower the error in
the system and the better the recognizer performs. The
lower Set 2 values correlate to the shape of the curves
represented in Figure 10; as EER decreases, the better
the curve appears. The EER values for the recognizer
reduce more slowly with 6 training templates, indicating
this to be the ideal starting point when asking a user to
train the system.
problems rather than weaknesses in the recognizer’s ability
to classify gestures.
6.2 Shoulder Surfing Attack Trial
We conducted a preliminary study to understand how free-
form gestures would resist shoulder surfing attacks. Towards
this end, we recruited seven participants from computer sci-
ence and engineering schools who had considerable expe-
rience with touchscreens. We assume that these volunteers
would likely to be more skilled with attacks than the gen-
eral populace to limit confounding factors. One of the seven
volunteers acted as the target who performs gestures and the
other six would be attackers who try to replicate target’s ges-
tures.
We chose three qualitatively different gestures as shown
in Figure 11 as examples. In the experiment, we first had the
target of the attacks exercise and get familiar with all three
gestures; then we collected gesture data from the target in a
way matching the original dataset: for each chosen gesture,
the target first repeated 10 times; after a short distraction
task, which included mental rotation and countdown, the tar-
get repeated another two times. Finally, we video recorded
one additional repetition the target made for each gesture.
Instead of having the target performing gestures in person
for every attacker, we played video recordings of that pro-
cess to the attackers, which ensured attackers would not be
affected by any inconsistency or difference within the per-
formance of the target.
During the shoulder surfing process, each attacker was
presented with all of the three videos, each of which con-
tained one of chosen gestures. The attackers were seated
always at the same spot, adjacent to the a chair at the ta-
ble where the display was setup. This was done in order to
emulate shoulder surfing. The order of videos played to each
attacker was produced in a Latin square to prevent any unde-
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sired effect on the performance of attackers. Each video was
played only once for each attacker. Then attackers were told
to repeat the gesture they observed from the video for five
times with the purpose of replicating it as well as possible.
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Figure 11: Gallery of Gestures used for shoulder surfing.
In order from left to right represents Gesture1, Gesture2,
and Gesture3 generated by the Target.
We measured shoulder surfing effectiveness of a gesture
using our multitouch recognizer discussed above. The tem-
plates we used are the 10 gestures from the Generate phase
of the target. Table 4 shows the result. All scores displayed
in the table are maximum score of that category, i.e. the
best attempt of either the target or attackers to replicate the
gesture. Score that are rendered as a 0 are because of the
fact that the recognizer immediately rejects template-gesture
matching where the finger count is different.
Participant Gesture1 Gesture2 Gesture3
Target (Recall) 4.36 4.31 6.75
Target (Video) 2.95 4.51 7.27
Attacker 1 0.50 0.00 0.97
Attacker 2 0.43 3.08 0.00
Attacker 3 1.07 0.00 0.00
Attacker 4 0.27 0.00 0.94
Attacker 5 1.10 2.19 3.96
Attacker 6 0.57 0.00 0.53
Table 4: Table of best scores for each attacker for each
gesture. The results show that none of the attacks were
successful: the passing score for the recognizer can be
set so that the Target can authenticate with ease and the
attackers are not authenticated.
From the Table 4 we see that there is not any overlapping
for scores of target and attackers. This indicates our recog-
nizer correctly differentiate attempts made by the target and
that by attackers. In general, the target is always authenti-
cating quite well across the the three gestures in comparison
to the poorer scores of the attackers. The only opportunity
where an attacker became close enough to steal the gesture
(Attacker 2, Gesture 2) still has a one point cushion around
it – high enough to prevent authentication by an attacker if
the threshold is set appropriately.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the first study of using free-form multi-
touch gestures for mobile authentication. Towards the end of
analyzing the security and memorability of the gestures, we
presented a novel metric based on computing the estimated
mutual information of repeated gestures. We designed and
implemented a practical multitouch recognizer as an authen-
tication system, and studied the robustness of free-form ges-
tures against shoulder surfing attacks.
Overall, the results are favorable to user-generated free-
form gestures as a means of authentication on touchscreen
devices.
Security, as estimated by Iˆ , is high enough for most pass-
words the users generated. We learned that multifinger ges-
tures do not show high security in this measure. It should
be noted though, most of multifinger gestures in our dataset
are gestures of multiple fingers repeating the same simple
shape, e.g. drawing a circle with three fingers. We believe
that the participants may overestimate the increase in secu-
rity by merely increasing number of fingers; when they de-
cided to use multiple fingers, they tended to choose a simple
shape because they believed multiple fingers gave them high
security despite simple shape. Such inconsistency in partic-
ipants’ perception and the actual security could be advised
against in the password generation user interface.
We also learned that, unlike with the length of a text pass-
word [33], the duration of a gesture does not play an impor-
tant role in Iˆ . Intuitively speaking, complex gestures with
high Iˆ should take longer time to perform. However, we
learned that even brief gestures can have high security. Ges-
tures with duration less than two seconds have an average Iˆ
less than 2% lower than the average Iˆ for all gestures.
By looking at our dataset, we found out that some sim-
ple shapes, even circles, would actually take more time to
complete than complex ones like signatures. The possible
reasons warrant further studies. At this point, we suspect
that complex gestures are also more difficult to reproduce
precisely. A good secure gesture should have both: inher-
ent complexity and easiness to perform. It is interesting in
this light that signatures are particularly good and resulted in
very high Iˆ . This means, although very complex to perform,
participants still managed to repeat them quite well.
When it comes to memorability, the data show that users
need a few repetitions to achieve a stable password. Like
with text-based passwords, the generation of passwords is
experienced as more demanding by users than recall. After
generation, Iˆ drops after an interval of >10 days by 15.66
percent. However, they are still recognizable as unique pass-
words. In addition, for a participant, the value of Iˆ varies
as they repeat the gesture. By continuously repeating, Iˆ
tends to stabilize. Unlike the text-based passwords, which
one has to input exactly, free-form gestures involve many
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sources of variance, which would be very difficult to keep
constant across different attempts. Therefore, one alternative
way of reporting security of gestures could be a range sim-
ilar to confidence interval, instead of an exact value. More-
over, studying gesture variability is a good topic for future
research, because a good balance must be found between
memorability and security.
Several participants were able to create highly secure and
memorable gestures. Below, we sketch strategies for gener-
ating such gestures. We plan to develop and test the guide-
lines and their effect on creating gestures in further studies.
These guidelines are illustrated with the best and worst ges-
tures in Figure 5, especially with the worst gestures being
simple multifinger circular motions.
1. General advice to promote consistency and retention:
Practice different gestures first in order to get used to
the touchscreen. Try out different gestures instead of
picking the first one, to find one you prefer. Pick a
gesture that will be used frequently to avoid forgetting
it. Take more care and pay attention. Do not rush.
Practice until faster and still accurate. Try to repeat
each trace as closely as possible.
2. Characteristics of High Iˆ gestures to emulate: Use many
sharp turns. Use a familiar gesture, for example, a sig-
nature. Use extra fingers to do different motions. Fol-
low the above rules even when adding fingers.
3. Characteristics of Low Iˆ gestures to avoid: Do not use
only few turns. Do not use gentle turns. Do not make
turns to only to the same direction, for example, avoid
doing a circle.
4. Specific errors to avoid: Place fingers down in the same
order each time. Use the same number of fingers each
time.
Our results from the recognizer show the capability of
free-form multitouch gestures to work as passwords in a prac-
tical authentication system. The gestures were classified by
the recognizer with relatively low error when being com-
pared across all 63 participants, indicating the ability of the
participants to generate passwords that a recognizer would
not have trouble classifying when comparing against multi-
ple templates. The recognizer generated much higher scores
when evaluating a participant’s gesture against their template
(ranging from 3 to 9) as compared to when it compared to
other templates (ranging from 0 to 1). Memorability of the
free-form gestures are also displayed through the EER val-
ues in recognizer results; the lowest EER value for the first
set is 3.34% and the lowest for the second set is 13.16%.
The disparity in the data sets can be attributed to two fac-
tors: 1) the first data set had only two authentication trials
compared to the second’s five trials and 2) the second data
set was performed after a much longer time span than in the
first set, thus, there were memorability issues between the
two sessions. The multitouch recognizer we designed and
implemented has room for consideration in the future, for
example, the effects of rotation, scale, and position invari-
ance as added degrees of freedom with free-form multitouch
gestures.
Finally, with our preliminary shoulder surfing attack trial,
we also learned that free-form gestures are relatively robust
against shoulder surfing. None of the attackers were able to
repeat the gestures well enough to be accepted by a practical
authentication system. We acknowledge that further more
comprehensive studies with several different kinds of ges-
tures and more opportunities for the attackers would be war-
ranted. For example, we could separate attackers into differ-
ent groups in which half of them are allowed to rewatch the
video recordings as many times they want to.
To conclude, our work shows that free-form gestures present
a robust method of authentication for touchscreen devices.
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